

Inaugural Symposium on National Security Leadership:



*Are We Prepared For the Complex
Challenges of the 21st Century?*

(From October 15, 2008)

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Executive Summary

On October 15, 2008, a symposium was held in Alexandria, VA, entitled *National Security Leadership: Are We Prepared for the Complex Challenges of the 21st Century?*

The symposium was developed, hosted, and organized by Dr. Mark Mykityshyn, Chairman of the US Army War College Board of Visitors; it was co-chaired by General Richard Myers, USAF (ret.), and General Peter Pace, USMC (ret.). The symposium sought to discuss and debate the kind of strategic leadership required for the U.S. to succeed in the 21st century national security strategic environment.

To that end, 70 plus leaders and stakeholders from a variety of institutions participated, including the military's Senior Level Colleges, civilian learning institutions, DoS, DHS, OSD, the Joint Staff, industry, and think tanks.

The open forum discussion format was orientated around three major themes:

- Identification of characteristics that will define and shape the future environment;
- The kind of strategic leadership needed to succeed in this environment; and
- Actionable recommendations.

The future environment discussion was relatively short based on the quality of common knowledge in the room. However, this dialog set an appropriate stage for a conversation regarding desired characteristics of strategic leaders, and the construct under which those individuals will need to operate.

In the case of strategic leader attributes, the conversation quickly shifted to how we might construct a national security professional framework that enables future strategic leaders to be successful. A significant amount of time was spent examining potential “whole of government” approaches to the negotiation of national security challenges. The group spent appreciable time sharing thoughts about how our respective Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) system currently educates leaders capable of accomplishing current and prospective national security missions. The JPME system was contrasted with other educational constructs within the Federal Government.

The main consensus of those in attendance was an acknowledgement of the need, on an interagency basis, to recognize national security as a *profession*, with equally-recognized value placed on education, assignment, and joint training / deployment experiences. There was a recognized need for a prospective Goldwater Nichols-type legislation that would require the Departments to operate in a truly interagency-supportive manner.

As a result of these deliberations, Dr. Mykityshyn agreed to take the lead in establishing a working group in order to address the following (related) issues:

- Where can existing legislation, executive orders, DoD directives / instructions, and Service regulations be modified in order to facilitate the creation of a national security profession?
- Where, and in what context, is new legislation, executive orders, DoD directives and instructions, and Service regulations needed? And, in particular;
- How could interagency human relations rules be developed that truly facilitate “cross-pollination” within the national security profession?

Attributed Introductions

Dr. Mark Mykityshyn:

Mark welcomed those in attendance at the conference and thanked them in advance for their time and participation. He reemphasized that the focal point of the dialog was to share insights about how we educate and develop our future strategic leaders, and that the idea for the symposium emanated from his observations as Chair of the Army War College Board, particularly that no dialog currently exists at the Governance level between the Senior Level Colleges. Consequently, the thought was that if that's not happening among a small group of military PME institutions, it was logical to assume that there could not be a robust enough dialog between the military and other agencies that will need to work closely together in the context of the new strategic environment.

So, why the focus on education, and why now? Dr. Mykityshyn talked about moving beyond Goldwater Nichols toward an increasing focus on interagency work, and viewing national security as a "system". In the context of national security as a system, his view was that education should be viewed as foundation piece of an architectural construct for such a system.

He introduced the three panel members, each of whom delivered prepared remarks.

Gen Richard Myers, USAF (ret.):

As we look forward to the future we need to ask ourselves: Are we training strategic leaders in the right way? Is training at War Colleges (senior level colleges) and similar institutions dynamic, or is it the same Program of Instruction experienced when I attended War College in 1980? Gen Myers identified three key aspects necessary of senior leaders as we prepare for the future:

1. Intellectual agility – is a key component of senior leadership. Senior leadership does not and should not begin at COL level. Some service cultures are better than others at fostering this;
2. Understanding nuance – absolutely must know key issues, but it is the understanding of issues and information and then turning that around as basis for decisions;
3. Ability to integrate across a variety of organizations. We teach in stove pipes (services) and ask the future leaders to integrate thoughts and concepts throughout the joint strategic environment. In the future we need to integrate across the interagency as well. Think we do a fair job of this but could do much better.

Gen Myers stated that as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), it was difficult to find people who could truly think at a strategic level, and that some combatant commanders did it better than others. Additionally, Gen Myers personally thinks we can do a better job educating and training our senior leaders for future success. In conclusion, he thanked those present for attending and encouraged participation from all throughout the conference.

General Peter Pace, USMC (ret.):

Gen Pace cautioned against “group think”. Within the institution of Goldwater-Nichols, we no longer have the discussion of command of joint forces by a Joint Task Force commander. He is worried about young officers trying to be “joint” before they should be. He doesn’t want all young officers educated exactly the same way, since there is strength in diversity. As CJCS, he wanted input from young officers on their unique service perspectives. He thinks we may be conditioning young officers that being a team player first means “checking their service at the door”. Gen Pace does not believe that this is the right approach.

He related marked differences in perspective from his thoughts 20 years ago at the National War College, compared to his thoughts when he served as CJCS. At Professional Military Education levels, he was of the opinion that we have both the opportunity and obligation to educate and develop members of the interagency who will need to work together in the future. At present, the services are doing this well, but we need to catch-up the other members of the interagency in terms of education.

He talked about stovepipes at highest level (just below President) and thinks there should be a “Goldwater-Nichols II” type legislation to carry joint education to joint-interagency aspects. Presently we are lacking an Interagency Commander that can synchronize all elements of national power when responding to a crisis.

Gen Pace believes an opportunity exists to educate government workers to cross interagency lines in a fashion similar to how we have crossed service lines with JPME. We must figure out how to educate young officers in interagency, while maintaining a strong service education.

Mr. Peter Swartz:

Initially, he drew parallels to the Yalta Conference where Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin had to overcome differences. He also noted that the geopolitical landscape is changing rapidly; that the challenge today is to try to prepare for that continual and sometimes very rapid change. While we can’t predict the future, we should usefully think about the future in order to prepare successors to succeed. Peter postulated several key questions of the future environment:

What should be the requirements for education? What are the steps we need to take now to shape Professional Military Education? What are the salient characteristics that define the 21st century strategic environment?

A. Demographics.

- Collapse of Russia. Number of working population in that country is declining. Could there be immigration issue with Russia?
- Most violence in world is carried out by men ages 18-35. Where are they? They are predominantly Africa and the Middle East.
- Immigrants will continue to come to US. Europe has differing view of immigration, examining reductions at the same time as it faces the effects of declining population.

- Young people extremely connected through technology. Gap between current generation of senior leaders and young people is way larger than we understand.
- Rise of women is a salient demographic. Number of law school grads is predominantly women. Women will take more leadership roles in future.

B. *Geo-economics*. Could current economic conditions could be a fundamental change in globalization or simply a blip on the economic changes of our time? Could there be increased fragmentation or increased globalization?

- World resources. World is no longer driven by access to resources (e.g. Nigeria). Instead, knowledge-driven growth is more predominant (e.g. Singapore, China, and India). It is hard to think about future without considering impacts of China and India.

C. *Geo-politics*. New organizations such as Hezbollah cross established boundaries (political, military, criminal). A million NGOs now impact world.

- Those with incredible wealth of a few (e.g. Bill Gates, Richard Branson, “Google guys”) impacting geo-political landscape. How do we deal with / work with these actors?
- Rise of religion will be a significant force in the future.

D. *Environment / climate change*. Climate change will result in more extremes, more frequently, in more places in the world, with greater consequence. Water may be issue – either too much or too little. Ice melting in Tibet may impact water supply in Asia.

E. *Science and Technology*. Advances we have seen in our lives are just the beginning. Biology will be lead sector – and may enhance people. We will be different organisms than we are now. Example is neural-enhancement drugs that college students use. Synthetic biology -- anti-malarial drugs, anti E-coli, fuel grown for vehicles and other technological advances will impact our future.

Session I: Characteristics of the Future

The following comments have been captured in 'bullet' format only; no attempt has been made to assimilate the comments into emerging themes.

- Considering the environment is wrong way to approach problem -- shouldn't try to match desired capabilities to a guessed-at future. We should not be playing Nostradamus, but focused on building capacity. Think we need to work to be adaptive organizationally.
- PME is a good model, compared to other agencies (Department of State, etc.) which are weaker actors. We need to build on that and ensure we consider the future environment.
- World is more complex, do we need to build capacity across interagency? More complex world needs to be considered; it is no longer enough to go to the War College and learn deterrence and containment ---do we now have to concentrate on nation-building? What capability is needed to do that? Do we need a National Security Professional? The general consensus is that the younger generation wants to enter public service and serve, but we have not asked them to sacrifice and do so.
- With NSPD-10 there is a huge challenge convincing agencies other than DoD that they are part of the national security construct. NSPD-10 executors are trying to build PME for interagency.
- If we are trying to build a profession, what *is* the profession to which we / they will belong? Need to take time to define the profession. There is no proponent, no control as to how we develop this profession. Professionals require:
 - 1) Expert knowledge;
 - 2) Development of their young members;
 - 3) Defined jurisdictions and certification processes.
- To date, we have not structured national security as a profession. Must everyone be a strategic leader? May be everyone does not need to be.
- Need a ready force, one capable of doing all things at all times. Cited example of Hollywood's strategic communication contribution as an instrument of national security during WWII. Wants a corps of national security professionals in the kit bag so that he can reach in and select the right tool for the problem at hand. We don't always know what we will need in the future.
- Should professional national security education *replace* joint education or *supplement* it?
- There are more characteristics of the environment: less funding for agencies coupled with the trend of declining college grads in the science and technology disciplines. Fewer resources will

be available in the future for national security. Budget supplemental bills will eventually go away. What will the cumulative effect be on PME and future capacity-building?

- Should strategic leaders be identified earlier, much in the same manner that a concert pianist is identified at young age? We currently have War Colleges as a benchmark – by the time officers reach the rank of Lt. Col., it's too late to inculcate them. Should we not identify young leaders as a cadre and “track” them for strategic leadership later?
- How do we encourage / mentor people to develop themselves? How do we fold them into a professional organization? National Security problems tend to be “black swans” -- each is invariably a situation that is unprecedented. How can leaders be conditioned to expect unprecedented events (intellectual agility) and therefore be better prepared for success?
- We are more transparent today as a society. The entire world is more transparent, particularly with 24/7 national and international news cycles. We live in a world of reverberations and we never know where the shocks are going to come from.
- Most issues or changes are cross-cutting. Strategic thinkers understand this and remain flexible. Every issue is a “cross cutting” issue.
- Nationally, in the future, we cannot and will not operate in a vacuum. So, interagency and an ally / international community approach makes sense for the future. Education is a great “soft power” tool, and foreign students educated in American institutions can be and are a great national security asset. We need to ensure this continues in the future, especially in our senior level colleges.
- We are seeing a proliferation of non-state but powerful actors in the National Security arena -- NGOS, Bill Gates, etc. - how do we operationalize and educate them? Do they/should they have a voice in setting policy?

Session II: Strategic Leadership Needed

- Today there exists a blurring of distinctions amongst DoD, DoS, CIA, and DoJ. How does one blend military, law enforcement, and intelligence in an environment of diminishing resources and a changing world that is increasingly “non-Americanized”? We need a cadre of national security professionals as diverse as the Rainbow Plans of World War 2 as we prepare for our uncertain future.
- Once a talented National Security cadre is assembled, how do you pay / incentivize them amidst competition from the private sector? How do we best compete in the race to attract and retain talent?
- The latest U. S. Census reveals that non-Hispanic whites are declining in numbers, while the number of African-Americans and Hispanics increasing. Educational attainment in those groups needs to improve for this will impact the future. 47% of enrollees at UC-Berkeley are currently Asian; national high school graduation rate is 75%, but African-American High School graduation rate is just 50%. This is a national problem and needs to be addressed since this will have a direct impact future National Security.
- The medical profession is ahead of the national security profession. General practitioners / specialists / administrators all come together with their individual skills within regional medical centers. We need national security professionals with their individual skills able to come together to solve the dilemma of the day.
- Should we change Professional Military Education (PME) to Professional National Security Education?
- We should look at DHS. Look at HS / HD as a “profession” not defined to the American people and as a result one that engenders suspicion. This is a challenge for any professional start-up. The real danger is that others will not understand our motivations.
- We will rise to occasions as we always have. The Constitution is the mainstay for study and guidance.
- We are doing more than what people think we are doing in the war colleges as regards critical thinking.
- We have future challenges that we are beginning to understand in this room. For example:
 - DNI evolution...not even smooth
 - IA education pronouncement from White House -- greeted with skepticism?
 - Turf battles
- Today we can offer war college slots to other members of the interagency; but are without takers.

- The military is respected and funded; other members of the interagency are not. This is a huge challenge.
- Want future leaders to “self-select” themselves so they have intrinsic motivations -- need to define a joint-interagency profession similar how the services have inculcated people willing to die for their country. Have to introduce ethos and values to discussion.
- Our joint military education system is superb, but how do we educate in order to “dominate the future?” Should there be a joint interagency profession? How do we go forward with recommendation?
- We must get beyond technical / tactical proficiency as the primary goal of Professional National Security Education. Our junior folks are already performing microeconomics, critical infrastructure planning and repair, and informational work now.
- Are people in uniform too specialized? We must continue to get basic technical / tactical skills right. Need more collaboration sooner in careers and to occur more consistently between those in uniform and other professionals. Google is an example of a different way of thinking with respect to organizing leader thought.
- In the interim we need to go slowly as many different professions are considered. For example, in WWII, we were able to pick those needed for tasks because we had so many to pick from.
- We will need many, not just a few, strategic leaders. Don’t forget DOD civilians as part of the National Security Environment. We will need people that share a professional ethic, but bring a diversity of backgrounds / experiences.
- We should try to parallel the medical community. We deploy task forces specific to patient needs -- could do the same in National Security agencies. Key is integration. Create a Joint-Interagency profession -- we are doing that in intelligence and logistics but have not formalized a profession.
- HLS was able to garner public understanding and support by articulating to public the need for resources and support at highest levels. We need to have public support (not US alone, but the global community) for our National Security Professionals.
- Does the public really understand what our National Security goals and priorities are? Public support at highest levels is critical to our success. Point of engaging international community is also critical to success so they understand and are not threatened by our intent.

- Is PME failing? No! We need to involve people in PME system to challenge assumptions. Maybe PME system is pretty good. There is a lot of goodness that is going on (although room for improvement) -- a major overhaul may not be needed. We should be able to adapt present PME: this is not a wholesale change. Agreement exists that we can't lose emphasis on technical / tactical skills but should adjust personnel system to be flexible so we can build and retain strategic leaders.
- We need to be concerned about overloading young military officers. Don't make the Captains' heads explode. They still need to digest the "combined arms doctrine" and retain their tactical and technical proficiencies. We need to balance how much of what we are expecting from junior military officers versus what could be done by a similar-level person from the interagency.
- Once we elevate junior leaders we can't send them back: they have evolved to meet the needs of the new situation.
- "Hooah" is one of our greatest strategic strengths and one of our greatest weaknesses. The greatest strength of military "hooah" / can-do attitude is figuring how to get the mission done. One of our greatest weaknesses is that when we are not equipped with the needed specific skill set required, so we end up "in over our heads". Need to broker experience across the government, and ask ourselves how we retain trained personnel: need a flexible personnel system.
- Interagency education and profession have built in challenges. Other agencies /departments will fear that defense will take it over. How do you create the National Security profession that supports all elements of the interagency?
- Today the military is respected and funded, and is seen as dynamic and very responsive. Other agencies are neither respected nor funded, are seen as bureaucratic, and don't participate in PME.
- Quality of JPME is superb, build upon for joint / interagency need to grow from military to national security.
- Interagency weakness is lack of people. DOS can't send people to exercises. If they can't fill USSOUTHCOM or USAFRICOM Deputy positions, what will they be able to do for future organizations? Other agencies refuse taskers, stating they are not equipped and staffed to accomplish them.
- Where will proponency be for our National Security Professional? This is also a STRATCOM challenge.
- Helicopter concept is the ability to zoom out and see the big picture and zoom down into details.

- Those who could “helicopter” advanced to top levels of organization in business. Are adept strategic thinkers rewarded in the military? Can they, or do they need, to helicopter?
- What do we expect professionals to do? Being precedes doing, and knowledge precedes good discretionary judgments. Military environment also requires strong moral base as all decisions in this environment require a firm moral foundation. Should we be thinking about core strategic knowledge so that leaders can make sound discretionary judgments on a repetitive basis?
- Need leadership training for civilian civil servants in DoD and other agencies. As an example, GS-14s, GS-15s, and SESs at my national organization does not train leadership, and we do very little joint development.
- The interagency environment now is such now that no one is in charge. We need personnel who can direct tactical, operational, and strategic tasks. In this room we have 2 Ph.D.’s who were also Blue Angels, which speaks well for a military that allowed for a breadth of achievement. Future interagency professionals will need a similar breadth of training and experience.
- Need both education and experience; this is not an either or decision.
- Need to build our cultures in the agencies, exercising strategic patience. We are not the lead in everything.
- Today there is an uneven reward for strategic leadership. Need training in military to develop assistance and diplomacy. We must change the culture in many agencies. In the past, great leaders were precluded from getting to highest level because the leader’s background was Corps of Engineers, “and we don’t promote engineers to 4-star”.
- How do we get the ethos of interagency and how do we “get” strategy? What is vision for the national security professional? Is it broad, or more narrowly defined?
- Suggestions of going back to Goldwater-Nichols type of legislation. Concept is people could assume multiple identities, they can retain service culture, and add layer of national security. Control of the Education, Assignment, and Accreditation were developed as joint layers. This became the engine that drove professional ethos, doctrine, and allowed definition of professional development path. Step one is to gain control of interagency process. This will be tougher now because Goldwater-Nichols was all within DOD, whereas interagency will require Presidential and Congressional action. With whom do we deal from Congress? Should we create a process or committee within the Federal Government that controls education, assignment, and accreditation of National Security Professionals? (This would be the HASC or SASC equivalent for the National Security Professional.)

- Others concur about concept of “Goldwaters-Nichols II” type legislation. DOD is able to train / educate because manning levels include factor for people to go to school. Resourcing would be required to get interagency partners to this level. If a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) ended Iraq involvement by 1 month, the \$10B saved would build a lot of capacity within the interagency. Let’s spend the money up front.
- Intel profession plan as a tough case study is revealing: the hedgerow fights by all parties were exhausting.
- We have common planning and execution methods as a military -- both in training and with current operations. Bringing people together across the interagency in educational environment is not the only way. Planning mechanism, mechanism for exercising in the field (and actual operations), and an educational process are critical components to making interagency operations work -- allowing agencies to assimilate to one another.
- Consider broadly-available and early possibility for world class graduate school attendance as a stimulus for the critical thinking and interrelation exposure we need. We have been hindered by our relatively late timings of attendance, and being slotted into the wrong follow-on assignments based on an archaic personnel system.
- People self-select. We need to identify them early. To gain an understanding of how society works, and how people self-select, see Empire Wilderness by Kaplan.
- Personnel / assignment system is a “push” system -- HR managers push people to organizations. A “pull” system would allow gaining organizations to take an active interest in the work officers are doing in their educational institutions. We need to ensure we do not penalize school folks versus “line” folks. How is the institution better off because of PME? Culture can enhance us or hold us back. Today’s mil leaders have one foot in military operations and one foot in more worldly conditions -- we must strive for balance
- We don’t optimize return on national investment of officers going to school. The real benefit to PME is time. We have a hard time separating operational and educational experience. The graduate level of education results in the ability to think critically. Operational experience is the employment of critical thinking skills. Both are needed. Do not select early, otherwise it is Russian roulette. We don’t even know what our most valued skills will be in the future, so how can we train / educate them?
- A graduate level of education should not be defined as attendance at a school. It should be defined as a level of critical thinking, and an opportunity to exercise it. Who should get the opportunity to attain that level of thinking? How do you measure it? Exposure in academic

environment does not necessarily make effective practitioners. Discussion of how many should get the higher level educational opportunity.

- Example of Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) not getting promoted to Colonel: we say they are important but not rewarded with promotion. Juniors can see through this very quickly and then vote with their feet.
- Goldwater Nichols was seen as a draconian force feeding.
- Think about inventive and effective incentives. As an example, West Point retention after the 5 year commitment was seen as a problem over the past several years. Solutions included:
 - + 2 years assignment selections
 - + 2 years location guarantees
 - + 3 years graduate school between 8-10 years but, students have to get there on their own
- 47% of USMA students elected graduate school last year, because they want to serve and they feel they have more control of their careers (e.g. self selection). We need to focus on incentives to induce self selection. Today we are a mobile society with mistrust of institutions.
- ADM Crowe was highlighted as someone who succeeded as a maverick -- outside of the norms - he pursued what interested him. Stayed a conventional sub subject matter expert, and then expanded his experiences. Do we want to create a single path or parallel paths to success?
- War and peace was totally different pre-WWII. The Defense Department slept before the war, and the State Department slept during WWII. National Security Professionals would continue from peace to war to peace again. This continuous spectrum of activities never allows for a break or down time, however.
- We need to be careful about the “Art of the Attainable”. Development of military officers is responsibility of Service Chiefs, not Chairman of CJCS. Each officer needs to be tactically solid before becoming “purple”. How can we build this capability in interagency?
 - How can you develop a system so that “pioneers” (self-developers, off the beaten career track) are recognized and nurtured?
 - How do they survive in their service? Department?
 - Where are the exit and entrance points to service / department careers?
 - How do we dual track: strategic thinkers and operational performers?
- We remain an advocate of dual tracks. Some need to be great operators and others strategic thinkers. Need more tolerant assignment process. In a resource limited environment, the most limited resource is time in an officer’s career. Example: naval aviator -- the ones that are flying are getting promoted. We are not rewarding “pioneers” that take different career paths. This actually prevents people from “self-selecting” what they are truly interested in order to get promoted.

- Need fluidity in personnel systems (e.g. promoting strategic thinkers or technicians like FAOs and Contracting Specialists) and we need the ability to transition from one element of the interagency to another and back again, to gain multiple perspectives.
- Opinions are expressed that we need to facilitate interaction and assignments between military and interagency. Where can young professionals go to see if they are any good at interagency? Presently, DoD seems to “get it”—How do we encourage others to “get it? How do we cause everyone to come to the table? Who approaches Congress to enact legislation?
- We sometimes confuse management with leadership: Douglas “Breaking the Phalanx” Macgregor is an example of what happens to some strategic thinkers. We need to reform our personnel systems.
- Our need is for civilian strategic leaders (to be educated) as a National Strategic Leader, similar to JPME.
- Congress and public opinion do not support a National Strategic Leader.
- Is it possible to model asset-wide requirements across the interagency?
- Today, too much leadership is in hands of military. Need to get proper leaders in proper positions -- may be from other agencies. We need a lead for Interagency planning, a place for young officers to gain education and experience.
- We need to change the cultures of organizations that support national security by:
 - Reorganizing career path
 - Choosing people more effectively
 - Developmental assignments
- POTUS directed Packland commission that spread Goldwater Nichols: we need leadership; a commission for National Security Professionals.
- When we created space professionals, they were willed out of services. We need a similar career development for national security professionals.
- What is the role of mentorship in National Security Professional Development? Talked about self selected leaders -- who is guiding young 23-year old fighter pilots (for example) to steer them to life beyond the cockpit? Interagency assignments may have merit to develop these leaders in lieu of education.
- We need career paths that go Interagency for National Security Professionals.

- What will be the role of Congress in National Security as a profession? Reflection is that Goldwater-Nichols reform -- now seen as a great thing -- was not widely embraced at the time of its passage. It took one determined Senate staffer to get it done. Point is that most government agencies have a sophisticated power base in Congress to avoid working with DoD. Feeling is that any interagency effort is going to have to be done via legislation.
 1. What needs to be made a matter of law?
 2. What can President do via executive order?
 3. What can SECDEF do?
 4. What can Service Chiefs do?
- Discussion continued concerning National Security as a profession. Do we need to have a PhD program in National Security to “legitimize” it as a profession?
- Should there be a PhD in National Security? Do we need it or want it? Goldwater-Nichols looked impossible before it became law.
- Presently Jim Locher is doing a study on the 1947 National Security Act. Do we need a new 1947 DoD Act to institute a National Security Professional?
- Another bipartisan group is studying the same thing -- the Center for Global Engagement. A bipartisan group working on National Security Act of 2009 is already working. How can this group / initiative be leveraged?
- What resources are needed beyond funding?
- Should we rename NDU to NSU? What is the role for the Joint Staff in National Security Professionals?
- There needs to be engagement with senior civil servants that are entrenched in their organizations. A National Security University should be established. Should head of this potential organization start with Department of State, then CIA to entice these agencies to get on board (similar to service leads at NDU)?
- We need to get away from old thinking. Need to have Grand Strategy of the US (Presidential-level) as foundation for interagency cooperation. Follow it with roles and missions for specific agencies. These fundamentals are essential to shape development of National Security leaders. Do we need a National Strategy Office in the White House?
In the past there were triggers to changes in government:

Trigger

Legislation

Army/Navy cooperation

DoD reorganization 1947

Desert One
9-11

Goldwater-Nichols
Homeland Security

- What is our trigger for National Security Professional?

Session III: Actionable Recommendations

Some macro-level themes emerged from the symposium:

- The need for a National Security Profession: This would be a joint, interagency profession with assignments, education, and accreditation. Need a boundary around the profession so that there can be promotion, etc. Should do it first in the DoD and invite other agencies to participate. Such a National Security profession must be interagency in nature; such a directive must come from directly from the President.
- Prior to a discussion about political strategy concerning how to achieve such an endstate, a clear definition of what is desired must be articulated. Among the desired characteristics include the need to preserve the autonomy of existing war fighting professions. While they should contribute to the joint interagency community, the retention of basic war fighting skills is essential.
 - How -- National Security Professional.
 - What -- Joint & Interagency Profession needs to be created.
 - Lots of civilians “the framework” is in place -- schools, people, assignments, etc.”
 - Warfighting organizations have been over-homogenized. Let services manage at lower level.
- Need to be beyond DoD or the feel of a “stovepipe” remain; need POTUS lead to establish
- National Security Professional must be bigger than any one department. If we start with one department such as DoD, it will turn off all of the others. Sweeping change is required to come from White House.
- Pilot program at National Defense University for DHS, FSI, OSD has met with mixed success. Need to turn pilot program into an operational reality. Program needs a push to inculcate in all agencies.
- Takeaway: Worth creating National Security Professionals or Interagency Professionals
Four potential next steps presented:
 - Create an interagency National Security profession;
 - Taking control of education, assignment, and accreditation key to creating the profession;
 - Congressional legislation will be essential;
 - National Security Act of 2009 is wrong approach—this one piece (creating the profession) is a doable political agenda.

- Dissent: culture change and resourcing will also be critical. Discussion on requirements driving resources as a proper progression, and concern over success in winning resources (e.g. Dep't of State) ensued. Further discussion on using industry models such as Toyota, etc. encouraging broader view of problem.
- The basic structure for service and education exists now. Other members of Interagency will come if resourced.
- We need to go beyond making this construct military-dominated; and don't put generals in charge. Consider a civilian base to this effort. Training and education is needed for all members of interagency.
- With the establishment of a National Security Professional we will also need to better to network the Interagency for professional development and sharing of ideas.
- Additional dissent was voiced in advocating a "network" of National Security professionals. View presented that existing PME is good start with tactical level expertise early in careers and evolve to "jointness" over time. Today, all agencies are not at same level with respect to leader training within their organizations. There is a concern over capability of other agencies to build capacity, and they could end up following DoD.
- Follow KISS principle (Keep It Simple Stupid) -- there is already a network. One interagency profession would have one leader and could possibly marginalize others throughout various agencies.
- No one has really looked at interagency history over the past 10 years. The new administration may fall in on a DHS that does not resemble FEMA of the past. Is the climate right for this type of change?
- Network of professions falls short since others will fall out, leaving military holding the bag.
- Maybe we should begin with a network and then grow into National Security Profession.
- Do we need a media article to describe the National Security Profession?
- The train is already moving. New HLS challenges for the new administration are on the table. Can we do both?
- Our military personnel system is still "World War II-ish". We have tinkered with it over the years, but it has not fundamentally changed. Fundamental change of this system is critical to

evolution. Shaping HR to support strategy and organizational goals is key to our success. (Shell Oil recently promoted its chief of HR to be its CEO because it recognized the importance of the function). Think about profession from a systems approach and create working groups for specific actions that we could take. Potential steps include:

1. Presidential Executive Order. How can we re-engineer what's been done so far to present it to the next Administration and/or Congress? Executive Order calls for education, training, and professional development requirements before promotion to SES level. Strategy and implementation plan already underway. How can we leverage?
 2. Define what we mean by a profession.
 3. Define how each agency's HR works to support this profession.
- Today, the profession does not exist, only the desire exists. We need norms and an ethos. We also need Congress to say "let's go" across all committees: Armed Services; Foreign Relations; Intelligence, etc.
 - This is not new, it has been done before.
 - Great opinions, difficult challenge = consensus. The actionable item is to move from concept to profession for National Security Interagency.
 - Is it dangerous to consider a unitary executive? Hamilton said "no, you have someone to blame", and a unitary leader doesn't have power of the purse. In any case, we need to examine the education required to really understand and employ the complex federal government.
 - NSP education, training, professional development (experience) needed for profession. Qualifications should be created for promotion to SES. Perhaps make 1,500 of our 8,000 SESs NSP-coded, and 13,000 GS-15s. Go down to local and state levels. We need structural changes that match our aspirations (and the current Executive Order):
 - To change culture, change behavior
 - To change behavior, change legislation
 - To change legislation, engage Congress
 - We must have the right people in the Executive Steering Group, those who can speak for their organizations, and transmit actions to be accomplished, before this can be seen as a credible effort.